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Over the course of the twentieth 
century, the discovery of oil in Saudi 
Arabia caused the United States and the 
United Kingdom to make military and 
foreign policy decisions based on the 
need to secure a steady supply. The Gulf 
States also made political decisions 
based on the desire to maintain the 
enormous influx of wealth introduced 
into the region with the discovery of oil. 
Both the US and the UK had stakes in 
Gulf oil since their countrymen first 
discovered it there at the turn of the 
century. Oil was discovered in Iran in 
1908 by the UK’s William D’Arcy and in 
Bahrain in 1932 by Standard Oil of 
California.1 The lives of people today in 
Saudi Arabia, the US and the UK are 
shaped by events resulting from these 
discoveries and the economic and 
military necessity for oil.  
Britain needed large amounts of oil 
during WWI, when it used the oil-fueled 
military tank for the first time. The 
enemy German army still traveled by 
railway. The switch to oil-powered 
tanks eventually helped the Allies win 
the war, but eighty percent of the Allies’ 
oil came from Standard Oil of New 
Jersey (later Exxon), causing US officials 
to fear they’d run out of the precious 
commodity. The government prompted 
US oil companies to follow Anglo-
Persian entrepreneur William D’Arcy’s 
lead and turn to the Persian Gulf. 
Unfortunately, British companies 
already had a monopoly in Iraq, Iran, 
and the smaller Gulf States.2 The British 
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) had the 
most holdings in the Middle East, so 
Standard Oil of New Jersey decided to 
join the IPC. Other members of the IPC 
included Socony-Vacuum (later Mobile), 
BP, Royal Dutch/Shell, and the state-
owned French company Compagnie 
Francaise Petrole. All members made a 
pact called the “Red Line Agreement” 
not to embark on independent 
exploration without the express 
approval of the other members. This 
agreement allowed British companies to 
maintain a great deal of control over the 
Mideast oil market even with the influx 
of new international companies in the 
region. The territory outside of the “Red 
Line” included Saudi Arabia.3  
In 1932 the American company 
Standard Oil struck oil in Bahrain, and 
island only 20 miles from Saudi Arabia, 
sparking US interest in the area for the 
first time. Standard Oil of California 
(Socal) chose to operate outside of the 
IPC and its strict limitations on 
exploration. When the IPC required 
Gulf Oil, another American company, to 
sell its Red Line concessions, Socal 
bought Gulf’s Bahrain concession for 
$50 thousand. After Socal found oil, 
both Socal and the IPC approached King 
Abdel Aziz for rights to explore Saudi 
Arabia and possibly drill for oil. In 1933, 
the Saudi king gave the American 
company the concession rather than the 
British-controlled IPC because he 
thought Americans showed less interest 
than the British in colonial intervention. 
As payment, Socal gave the king 
L30,000 in gold as an interest-free loan 
followed by L20,000 more in the next 
eighteen months. The king agreed to 
pay back the loan in future oil revenue, 
if it ever materialized, and he secured 
for himself a yearly payment of L5000.4 
Unlike all other concessions thus far, 
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Americans owned this one exclusively, 
its size exceeding the combined states of 
Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. Socal 
soon formed a subsidiary company 
called the California Arabian Standard 
Oil Company (Casoc).5 Suddenly, there 
existed an alliance between at least one 
major American oil company and the 
emerging oil-rich country of Saudi 
Arabia. US interest in the region only 
increased as Saudi oil success continued.  
More American companies got 
involved in the growing market in Saudi 
Arabia as more oil emerged in the 
country. In 1936, the IPC denied Casoc 
access to its consumer markets, so Casoc 
chose to merge with Texas Oil (later 
Texaco, now part of Chevron), which 
controlled markets in Asia but didn’t 
possess enough oil to service them.6 The 
deal allowed Texas Oil 50% interest in 
the Casoc concession.7 Saudi oil fields 
continued to prove their worth when 
the well “Dammam-7” at Dhahran blew 
in March 1938, producing more than 
1500 barrels of oil per day.8 Saudi 
Arabia quickly became a major oil 
player, especially in comparison to the 
US whose wells only produced 100 
barrels per day. King Abdel Aziz’s first 
royalty check from Casoc exceeded $1.5 
million, and he quickly augmented 
Casoc’s exploration space by 80 
thousand square miles. The new area 
gave the company rights to over half of 
Saudi territory. In 1939, Casoc averaged 
11 thousand barrels per day, and within 
ten years, it averaged 477 thousand 
barrels, accounting for five percent of 
total world oil production and 35 
percent of Middle-East production.9  
The ongoing oil success in Saudi 
Arabia showed American statesmen 
that companies who depended on 
American oil alone stood no chance of 
competing with the emerging market in 
the Middle-East. Furthermore, Saudi 
Arabia remained a reliable military ally 
to the US and the Allies during the 
Second World War by providing Allied 
forces access to essential strategic air 
routes across the Arabian Peninsula. 
President Roosevelt also came to realize 
the importance of Saudi oil for US 
success at war. These combined factors 
prompted the President to create the 
Petroleum Reserve Corporation (PRC) 
in 1942 “to acquire petroleum, 
petroleum products, and petroleum 
reserves outside the continental US.”10 
Furthermore, as a result of its proven 
economic and military value to the US, 
in 1943 Roosevelt qualified Saudi Arabia 
for land-lease assistance. Confidence in 
this decision was strengthened when 
Saudi Arabia provided safe passage for 
war supplies through the Persian Gulf 
waterway from the US and Europe to 
the Soviets.11 Saudis found money from 
land-lease assistance essential, since the 
usual income from Muslim pilgrims 
making the hajj dried up during the 
war.12  
President Roosevelt wanted the US 
government to have a more direct role 
in Saudi Arabian oil, so he asked 
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes to 
negotiate a deal with Casoc (which 
changed its name to Aramco, the Arab 
American Company, in 1944) allowing 
the US government to purchase a 
majority of its shares. With the US 
government literally owning stock in 
Aramco, the company’s potential for 
growth greatly increased. In fact, 
between 1944 and 1950, Aramco’s gross 
production of crude oil increased from 
21 thousand to 548 thousand barrels per 
day. The growth was enormous but 
necessary, since the reconstruction of 
Europe after WWII depended on this 
oil. Although the US at the time only 
imported six percent of its oil, and Saudi 
Arabia provided only eight percent of 
that amount, Western Europe depended 
almost entirely on Persian Gulf oil.13  
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In February of 1945, not only 
realizing the importance of Saudi oil for 
the war effort but also concerned by the 
dwindling supply of US oil, FDR met 
with the Saudi King Abdel Aziz ibn 
Saud aboard the USS Quincy on Great 
Bitter Lake south of the Suez Canal.14 
FDR determined that the “defense of 
Saudi Arabia is vital to defense of the 
United States.”15 The meeting 
encouraged the Saudi leader, who 
remained neutral in the war effort, to 
officially support the Allies in March 
1945. The meeting also resulted in the 
President’s first conversation with an 
Arab leader about the escalating 
situation in Palestine. Before the 
meeting ended, FDR promised not to 
change policy in Palestine without first 
consulting both Jews and Arabs. He also 
assured the King that he would never 
do anything hostile to Arabs, and put 
the promise in writing one week before 
his death in April.16 This promise soon 
caused tension between the two 
countries, putting US oil interests at 
risk.  
Relations between the US and Saudi 
Arabia became strained for the first time 
in November of 1947, when the UN 
passed a resolution supporting the 
partition of Palestine.17 This led the way 
for the United States to recognize the 
State of Israel in May of 1948. The 
Presidential administration in the US 
initially feared this might negatively 
affect oil relations between the US and 
Saudi Arabia. King Aziz saw the action 
as a betrayal, but did not withdraw oil 
concessions, realizing that they were 
vital to Saudi Arabia’s economic 
survival.18 The US gave the country $99 
million in aid between 1940 and 1947, 
and it expected only 25% of the loan to 
be repaid.19 Its financial relationship 
with the US also played a role in Saudi 
Arabia’s decision to send only a small 
battalion into the Arab-initiated fray in 
the newly-declared state of Israel, even 
as Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon, 
and Iraq invaded the state in full force. 
By remaining essentially neutral, the 
Saudi government managed to preserve 
its relationship with the US. His 
neutrality also caused Aziz to come 
under attack from other Arab leaders, 
but the King’s focus lie elsewhere.20 
Aramco struck oil at Ghawar in 1948, an 
area soon classified as the world’s 
largest oil deposit, and the company 
needed more markets to buy its new 
excess of oil. It merged with American 
companies Standard Oil of New Jersey 
and Socony Vacuum, who left their IPC 
contracts.  
The King trusted the American 
companies; his biggest fear was that 
they might one day merge with the likes 
of British imperialists. He remained 
unaware that in 1949 the US National 
Security Council secretly approved of a 
plan to destroy Saudi oil fields in the 
case of a Soviet attack. The CIA also 
secretly shipped explosives into the 
kingdom to prepare for this possibility.21 
Like most foreign relations during the 
Cold War, US interest in Saudi Arabia 
was linked to US competition with the 
USSR, and US intentions in Saudi 
Arabia weren’t always transparent. 
However, America’s perceived power 
over Saudi oil was not absolute for long.  
Saudi Arabia began taking interest in 
garnering more profit from its domestic 
oil supply. In 1950 the Saudi king 
insisted on the “50/50 Agreement,” 
demanding an equal share in Aramco 
revenue. In a clever manipulation of the 
US tax code, Saudi Arabia increased its 
profits by taxing Aramco’s profits. The 
code said a company operating in a 
foreign country could deduct the 
amount of taxes it paid to a host 
government from its US taxes. In this 
way, Saudi Arabia increased its profits 
! 60 
at no expense to Aramco.22 This seemed 
like a mutually beneficial solution to 
Saudi demands, but the trend for Arab 
control of Arab oil continued and 
became widespread. In 1951, riots in 
Iran caused oil to be nationalized by 
Prime Minister Mossadeq. In September 
of 1960, the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) was 
created at the Baghdad Conference, and 
its founding members were Iraq, 
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, and Iran.23  
The Iranian government proved 
itself a threat to independently 
controlled oil companies, and by 1967, 
the US began to question Iran’s 
intentions concerning oil and its 
relationship to the rest of the Middle 
East. In a conversation with US 
government officials, the Shah insisted 
he found it in Iran’s best interest to 
remain on good terms with Saudi 
Arabia. He realized oil companies 
shared this interest, and US interest 
paralleled that of the oil companies.24 
However, the situation with Iran 
intensified in 1968 when the UK 
announced its intention to withdrawal 
military support from the Persian Gulf 
within the next three years. Iran 
expressed an interest in taking Britain’s 
place in the military control of the Gulf; 
this interest had a major connection to 
the oil industry since Britain’s 
withdrawal from the region effectively 
ended its commitment to aid Kuwait in 
case of an attack. Kuwait had large oil 
reserves and sat in a strategic location 
between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran. 
The US government admitted in an 
internal foreign policy document that 
the UK withdrawal would end “a 
system which has played a major 
political and security role for the West 
in the Gulf region for a century and a 
half.” Twenty US oil companies based 
their business operations in Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, and these companies 
consistently brought large amounts of 
money into the US, adding to concerns 
for the safety of the region. 
Furthermore, in 1968 the Gulf produced 
a third of the world’s oil and two thirds 
of the world’s crude reserves. The UK 
obtained 60% of its oil from the Persian 
Gulf and the US obtained 85% of its 
military oil from the area.25  
US fears came to fruition during the 
Iranian Oil Crisis of 1973. In October, 
(one of) the Arab-Israeli War(s) 
commenced. Saudi Arabia responded to 
US support of Israel by instituting an oil 
embargo and production cuts. This 
caused inflation in the US and concern 
about foreign investment from oil 
producing countries. Oil companies 
soon found themselves in a political 
crossfire between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, both Arab countries with 
economic interest in maintaining 
alliances with the US. Officials from the 
US government, including Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger, met with the 
heads of oil companies based in the 
Mideast several times throughout the 
year.26 The US considered seizing Saudi 
oil fields by force, but the two countries 
eventually patched up their relationship 
through a shared opposition to 
communism and common economic 
initiatives. The US eventually made a 
deal to continue its oil business with 
Saudi Arabia.27  
The association between the US and 
Saudi Arabia proved mutually 
beneficially for both countries. Saudi 
Arabia’s 1973 acquisition of a 25% 
participation interest in Aramco 
increased the country’s interest in 
reconciliation with the US.28 The 
instability of oil in other countries in the 
Mid-East increased US confidence in 
Saudi Arabia thanks to the stability of 
its product. In 1979, the Iranian 
Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini 
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caused oil in Iran to be completely 
nationalized, and Saudi Arabia made all 
its excess crude oil available to Aramco 
(at the expense of other customers) after 
the Revolution caused an oil shortfall in 
the US.29 The US got most of its oil from 
Saudi Arabia that year (1347 thousand 
barrels per day).30 The US continued to 
buy a large portion of its oil from Saudi 
Arabia even after the latter acquired 
100% participation interest in Aramco in 
1980, buying out American companies 
completely by purchasing almost all of 
the company’s assets. (The company 
changed its name to Saudi Aramco in 
1988.)31  
Iraq eventually surfaced as the major 
threat to Mideast oil stability, for the 
first time when it entered into a war 
with Iran. Conditions in Iraq directly 
affected US foreign policy in the region 
because the US considered any 
instability in the area a threat to US 
interest in Saudi Arabian oil. In 
September of 1980, Iraq invaded Iran to 
reclaim Shatt al-Arab at the border 
between the two states. In the process, 
Iraq took over oil-rich Iranian 
Khuzestan. Neither Saudi Arabia nor 
the US showed opposition to this 
development since neither country 
wanted Iran to emerge victorious from 
the conflict – Saudi Arabia for ethnic 
and religious reasons, the US because of 
Iran’s ties to the Soviet Union.32 
Nonetheless, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War 
devastated Iraq’s economy, prior to 
which Iraq made $27 billion per year in 
oil revenue.33 In 1984, the “Tanker War” 
between Iran and Iraq put Persian Gulf 
oil traffic at risk as Iran targeted Iraqi oil 
tankers travelling by land.34 This 
prompted Reagan to secretly ship 400 
Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia after 
Iran targeted Saudi and Kuwaiti ships in 
the Gulf.  
In a fateful turn of events for US 
involvement in the Middle East, in 
August of 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait 
over an oil dispute. US President George 
HW Bush, Margaret Thatcher of the UK, 
and the Soviet Union’s Mikhail 
Gorbachev all wanted to remove Iraqi 
dictator Saddam Hussein from power, 
fearing he planned to target Saudi 
Arabia. An attack on Saudi Arabia 
would put the acquisition of oil at risk 
for all three countries, the US especially. 
The UN ordered economic sanctions 
against Iraq and also sent forces, led by 
the US, to protect Saudi oil. The action 
was termed operation Desert Shield. 
After talking to then Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney, Saudi Arabia 
agreed to host US troops and 
equipment. Secretary of State James 
Baker received UN backing when he 
proposed the UN evict Iraq from 
Kuwait by force if Iraq didn’t withdraw 
from Kuwait peaceably by January 19, 
1991. On that date, with UN demands 
unmet by Saddam Hussein, US 
Congress approved the use of force in 
Iraq. President HW Bush announced the 
beginning of the Gulf War which 
comprised of a 38-day “Desert Storm” 
followed by a four-day ground assault 
to quickly evict the Iraqis from Kuwait. 
This latter leg came to be known as the 
“100-hour War.” In total, 303 died in the 
Gulf War and fewer than 500 were 
wounded.35 The US managed to oust 
Iraq and its opportunistic dictator from 
a country very near to its precious 
interests in Saudi Arabia, but US forces 
did not oust the dictator himself. 
Hussein and his imperializing interest 
in oil proved to be a torment to the 
younger Bush administration 10 years in 
the future, a point of significance since 
oil continues to sustain Iraq’s economy. 
On average, the commodity brings in 
95% of the country’s foreign exchange 
earnings.36 
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Saudi Arabia put its safety from Iraq 
to good use by increasing its strength in 
the oil market, a move that was 
beneficial to its economic relationship 
with the US. Aramco became the most 
powerful player in the Saudi oil market 
in 1993, when it took charge of Saudi 
Arabia’s domestic refining, marketing, 
distribution, and joint-venture interests. 
Soon thereafter, the Kingdom named 
Aramco president and CEO Ali Al-
Naimi its Minister of Petroleum and 
Mineral Resources. US business interest 
became involved in this particular 
concentration of power in 1998 when 
Aramco, Texaco, and Shell established 
Motiva Enterprises LLC, a refining and 
marketing joint venture, in the US.37 In 
2000, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 
ranked Aramco the number-one oil 
company in the world for the eleventh 
straight year based on crude oil reserves 
and production. That same year, 
Aramco established Gulf Operations Ltd 
to manage governmental petroleum 
interests in the Offshore Neutral Zone 
between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  
Aramco’s success and ties to the US 
did not help to negate the fact that 15 
Saudi nationals directly participated in 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001 in New York City.38 The event 
caused an anti-Saudi outcry among the 
US citizenry. President Bush quickly 
tried to quell the anger toward Saudis; 
an administration spokesperson told 
reporters in October that the president 
was satisfied with the cooperation he 
received from Saudi Arabia for the “war 
against terror.”39 Nonetheless, since the 
September 11 attacks, Aramco went to 
great lengths to help assert Saudi 
Arabia’s modernity. The company 
began a program to build the King 
Abdullah University of Science and 
Technology, and in 2008 it launched a 
project to build the King Abdulaziz 
Center for Knowledge and Culture in 
Dhahran.40  
Saudi Arabia is still a major US oil 
partner. As of 2008, Saudi Arabia led 
most other suppliers of oil to the US, 
second only to Canada.41 Today Saudi 
Arabia owns the world’s largest proven 
oil reserves at an estimated 262 billion 
barrels. In fact, one-fourth of the world’s 
proven oil resources exist within Saudi 
Arabia, and the country relies on oil for 
90-95% of its total export earnings.42 
Other oil-rich countries include Iraq, 
Iran, Libya, Venezuela, and Sudan, but 
they do not enjoy the same partnership 
with the US as Saudi Arabia does. This 
is due in part to the fact that Saudi 
Arabia has proven itself a “swing 
producer,” putting oil on the market in 
times of crisis. It holds 85% of OPEC’s 
spare capacity.  
 US dependency on Saudi oil 
continued on from the point when 
Standard Oil first discovered the 
commodity there at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. US foreign policy 
often mirrored US oil dependence, a fact 
exemplified by FDR and his successors’ 
commitment to an alliance with Saudi 
Arabia and George HW Bush’s entrance 
into the first Gulf War. The oil market 
also directly impacted foreign policy in 
Saudi Arabia, a country that did not 
commit to extensive military action in 
the Arab-Israeli wars so as to maintain 
its vital oil-trading connection with the 
US. We see from these examples that the 
world as we know it today is shaped by 
political events from the past reflecting 
the global need for oil.  
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